Biology and law by Alexander, Richard D.
Biology and Law 
Richard D. Alexander 
Museum of Zoology, Insect Division, University of Michigan 
The terms "biology" and "biological" are widely used in ways that confuse and de- 
nigrate possible contributions of biologists to human self-understanding. As with social 
scientists, biologists deal with learning, developmental plasticity, and strategizing in 
virtually all species they study. It is from theories about how human strategizing is 
molded by selection that biologists can contribute to understanding topics like law. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
T 
he relationship of biology and law is the central theme of this issue. 
In this introductory essay, I discuss some underlying questions 
that are both crucial and difficult. The questions involve not only 
the relationship of biology to law, but the more general problem 
of a biological approach to human behavior. They represent issues that have 
caused much concern and misunderstanding across the past several decades. 
The first issue involves the meaning and usages of the terms "biology" 
and "biological." Inside the discipline of biology, these terms are used al- 
most exclusively to refer to the science or discipline that studies life: biology 
is the science of life--all life. Outside biology--notably in medicine, phi- 
losophy, the social sciences, and almost all disciplines that deal explicitly 
with humans--biology and biological are typically used to mean "physio- 
logical" or "genetic." To take an apparently innocuous example, the "bi- 
ological" father is in fact the "genetic" father. Another example, not so 
innocuous, is the opposing of "biological" and "cultural," or "biological" 
and "social ."  The reference is to causation: is the cause of that behavioral 
variation biological or cultural? Or: is it biological or social (meaning, in 
fact, genetic or environmental)? This usage can have pernicious effects be- 
cause it is sometimes extended to the false dichotomy of whether a behavior 
(as opposed to a behavioral variation) is "biological or social." When this 
dichotomy is interpreted as "genetic or environmental" the question is, as 
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someone has remarked, like asking whether the area of a rectangle is owing 
(or owing more) to its length or to its width. 
There is a certain logic behind the above dichotomies of usages when 
one considers the enormous 20th century expansion of the disciplines that 
deal with one or another aspect of human life. This expansion has caused 
biology to become, essentially, the discipline of all but human life. Biologists 
obviously do not consider most aspects of human existence in their analyses, 
and it is in the realms of physiology and genetics where the endeavors of 
biologists have typically joined those of human-oriented investigators. For 
a very long time, moreover, the study of behavior was all but excluded from 
biology as a science. Between approximately 1917 and 1950 (the period be- 
tween the demise of the Journal o f  Animal Behavior and the appearance of 
Konrad Lorenz' influential paper on the study of "innate" behavior pat- 
terns), entomologists were almost the only biologists studying social be- 
havior. There was an underlying feeling within biology that behavior could 
not be studied scientifically because it is too plastic, too changeable in the 
face of environmental fluctuations. The interesting and complex social be- 
havior of insects could be viewed as innate or inherited, or genetically de- 
termined, and no one much cared. Parenthetically, this was a period during 
which some severe imprecisions in theories about how selection worked 
(Williams 1966) were actually responsible for the seeming intractability of 
behavior to scientific analysis; plasticity was erroneously given the blame. 
Biology has been seen by many as (1) applying mostly to nonhuman 
forms of life, (2) restricted, especially in humans, to traits that tend to be 
directly relatable to physiological and genetic causes, and (3) explicitly not 
concerned with the traits that most seem to set humans apart--learning, 
sociality, and culture. 
I believe that these dichotomies and restrictions are having negative 
effects on humanity's efforts at self-understanding, and that they may inject 
confusion into the interpretation of publications like the present issue. I also 
believe they are involved in the fact, that in most parts of the world, the 
human-oriented disciplines have become or remained significantly divorced 
from the development of biology as the science of life. Only in medical 
matters, and there only in respect to physiological and genetic phenomena, 
has the connection been retained. Human-oriented scientists have not been 
required to keep pace with even basic developments in the science of bio- 
logy. In the United States, at least, it has been possible at many major 
universities (including my own) to obtain a Ph.D. in any aspect of the social 
sciences without having taken even an introductory course in the biological 
(or even the natural) sciences. Leaving aside detailed knowledge, a major 
consequence is that human-oriented scientists are not required to know 
about even the most broadly significant changes of focus, approach, or at- 
titude in biology. This means that if biologists believe they have new evi- 
dencedsay ,  from refinements of theory--that  bears upon efforts of humans 
to understand themselves (as they now do), the very idea may be greeted 
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with either groundless suspicion or misdirected enthusiasm deriving from a 
mixture of ignorance and the biases stemming from restricted usages of the 
word "biological" outside the discipline of biology. 
If "biological" means "physiological," "genetic," or both, a particular 
approach is suggested by a "biological" approach to human social behavior. 
What physiological or genetic mechanisms underly behavior? How might 
knowledge of such mechanisms affect practical social questions such as the 
interpretation or practice of law? If, on the other hand, biology is defined 
as the science that investigates life, something considerably broader is im- 
plied, which explicitly includes the question of how plasticity has been 
molded by natural selection, and how the environment molds the develop- 
ment or expression of behavior in each individual. 
One approach suggested by the narrower definition of biology is to 
search for a core of "basic" ("biological," "inherited," "innate," "non- 
malleable," "not-so-malleable," etc.) behavior attributes. If such a core of 
more or less unchangeable behavior patterns could be found, one has to ask 
next: what might be its significance for law? Those who advocate this kind 
of search may say that, having located such behaviors, we may assume that 
we can now identify (or justify searching for) expressions of law that (1) 
cannot be realized because they require alteration of nonalterable behaviors 
or (2) ought not to be tried because they somehow stress individuals or the 
whole species by requiring them to do something extreme or "unnatural." 
How does one recognize or locate "basic" behavioral attributes, as 
defined above? Some may believe it is possible by demonstrating that a 
behavior occurs not only in humans but in nonhuman primates related to 
humans. The argument seems to be that a behavior so distributed is (1) 
ancient, (2) has not changed, and (3) is evidently nonmalleable or must some- 
how be inherited. I have three reservations: (1) one must be careful to iden- 
tify convergences or parallelisms (patterns that are similar or have similar 
functions but evolved independently) as opposed to homologies (patterns of 
common origin); (2) even recently appearing patterns will have some rela- 
tionship to gene action, however remote and complex; and (3) an evolu- 
tionary background or a relationship to gene action in no way precludes 
plasticity or a strategic flexibility of response to environmental fluctuations. 
Quite the opposite, it is probable that every gene action must be viewed as 
a potential  to respond or not, or to respond one way or another, depending 
on the particular environment (Alexander 1985b). 
Another approach to locating "basic" behavioral attributes seems to 
lie in demonstrating particular kinds of physiological bases, mechanisms, or 
correlates of behavior. The implication seems to be that physiological cor- 
relates of behavior, because they are "closer" to gene effects, both prove 
that behavior has relatively nonmalleable aspects and also represent iden- 
tification of such aspects. Finally, if a behavior found in both nonhuman 
primates and in humans also can be demonstrated to have particular phys- 
iological or genetic correlates, then the argument for nonmalleable or innate 
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behaviors may seem to be reinforced. Caveats to all of these conclusions 
(hypotheses) are similar to those given above for the first. 
The above mentioned approach may also be regarded, it may now be 
seen, as the (or "an" )  evolutionary approach to law: first, one focuses on 
behaviors which, because they are found in both nonhumans and humans, 
appear to have great antiquity and to have been maintained over evolutionary 
time, or while primates are going through long-term evolutionary changes 
like speciation; and second, one connects the behavior to particular phys- 
iological or genetic mechanisms, implying that it is more reasonable to view 
it as subject to evolution (or genetic change guided principally by natural 
selection). I have already suggested what could be wrong with this approach 
and these assumptions (Alexander, in press). Are there, however, alternative 
approaches that may be regarded as "evolutionary" and "biological?" 
A different kind of approach, properly so labeled, does exist. This ap- 
proach derives from emphasizing not the physiological or genetic (proxi- 
mate) mechanisms of behavior but the adaptive or ultimate (i.e., reproduc- 
tive) functions. It is generated by using, as the predictive theory, the general 
process of organic evolution and its (long-term) cumulative effects. Some 
of these effects are highly predictable because (1) there are identifiable strate- 
gies that cannot be beaten [perhaps the first example was that given by Fisher 
(1958) for sex ratios; for the concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) 
see Maynard Smith and Price 1973)] and (2) variations in strategies are pre- 
dictable with variations in environments (Williams 1966; Alcock 1984; Dawk- 
ins 1976, 1983; Maynard Smith 1978, 1982; Krebs and Davies 1981, 1984; 
Charnov 1982; Alexander 1979). I think it is fair to say that this approach 
is the evolutionary approach of biologists. 
Evolutionary biologists generally accept that, genetically speaking, ev- 
olution is a fairly simple and singular process, evidently because life settled 
on DNA as the universal genetic material. Evolution is, however, guided 
principally by natural selection (for a review of the argument that this is so, 
see Alexander 1979). Selection is effected by the environment, and it is the 
variabilities and consistencies of patterns and sequences in environments 
that make the actual working of evolution a complex and challenging process 
to analyze. 
Biologists also seem to agreemand for reasons given--that selection 
tends to produce individuals who in the usual environments of history behave 
so as to maximize the survival of their own genetic materials, as opposed 
to maximizing either their own survival or the survival of the group, pop- 
ulation, or species. Precisely what is predicted from this dogma becomes a 
complex and intriguing science in itself (see above references, and Symons 
1979; Chagnon and Irons 1979; Alexander and Tinkle 1982; and journals 
such as Animal Behavior, Evolution, American Naturalist, Behavioral Ecol- 
ogy and Sociobiology, and Ethology and Sociobiology). The reason for both 
the complexity and intrigue is that predictions based upon the dogma are 
often dramatically divergent from intuition or common sense (e.g., the sub- 
Biology and Law 23 (171) 
theories having to do with population regulation, sex ratios, senescence, 
treatment of kin, and many others--see above references for specific 
discussions). 
An evident feature of this evolutionary approach is that it says nothing 
at the outset about proximate mechanisms (heredity, physiology) except that 
they are expected to be molded in the interests of relative success in re- 
production. No claim is necessary that a distinguishable core of "basic" or 
unchangeable behaviors exists, or that any particular policies may place 
strains on human capacities or tendencies. Indeed, most of the proponents 
of this approach have adopted the view that for humans, as for all other 
organisms, lifetimes represent strategies of reproduction in the face of en- 
vironments that are difficult to predict. (For example, it is clear that humans 
often choose "more stressful" or higher-risk courses of action when they 
believe that these better serve their purposes--e.g., Dickemann 1979). It is 
inaccurate to charge that the evolutionists' approach involves excessive de- 
terminism; on the contrary, game theory--the epitome of a rational choice 
theory of behavior--has been prominently incorporated into the analyses 
and predictions of these evolutionary biologists (e.g., Maynard Smith 1978; 
Krebs and Davies 1984; Dawkins 1983). 
It is worth emphasizing that for social behaviors, such as those involving 
law, the central aspects of the environment are other strategists (other human 
individuals and groups). Because social strategizing is central to human 
life--and, arguably, is even the central theme in the evolution of humanness-- 
the notion of a significant core of nonmalleable behaviors functioning in 
social life appears to be remote, and possibly even misleading or downright 
wrong. It would be the worst of all strategies to enter the competition and 
cooperativeness of social life, in which others are prepared to alter their 
responses, with only preprogrammed behaviors. It would be like trying to 
plan a game of, say, chess without reference to the moves of the other player. 
Robert Axelrod, in The Evolution of Cooperation, illustrates all of the 
misunderstandings I have discussed. In his effort to explain the relationship 
between his arguments and the views that have been criticized as unwar- 
ranted extensions of genetic reductionism into the social sciences, he re- 
marks; "this approach differs from that of sociobiology. Sociobiology is 
based on the assumption that important aspects of human behavior are 
guided by genetic inheritance (e.g., E.O. Wilson 1975). Perhaps so. But the 
present approach is strategic rather than genetic" (Axelrod 1984, p.ix). The 
dichotomy is false if "guided by genetic inheritance" is being opposed to 
"strategic," and also if the evolutionists' approach is being opposed to a 
"strategic" approach. 
What, then, can evolutionary biology (or biology in general) contribute 
to the study of law? It can do three things. First, it can explain much that 
we know about ourselves but have been unable heretofore to resolve, such 
as the paradox of the seeming duality of selfishness and altruism in human 
nature that David Hume referred to over 200 years ago as the "particle of 
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the dove" and the "elements of the wolf and the serpent," and that has 
plagued philosophers at least since ancient Greece (cf. Frankena 1980 with 
Alexander 1979; Trivers 1985; Chase 1980; Hirschleifer 1982; Masters 1982; 
Axelrod 1984). 
Second, it can predict behaviors, most particularly among those still 
unaware of the tenets of evolutionary theory. Contrary to widespread opin- 
ion, these predictions can be detailed and nonintuitive. I have argued (Alex- 
ander 1978, 1979, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, in press) that predictions from biology 
can be useful even in arenas like the structure of law and the responses of 
individuals to it. i 
Third, and as a result of the above two items, the approach from ev- 
olutionary biology can lead to changes in behavior that are the consequence 
of a deeper self-understanding of humanity. Albert Einstein is quoted as 
having said that the splitting of the atom ushered in an era in which humanity 
would be led inescapably toward disaster unless a fundamental change in 
its attitude toward itself and its social and political interactions could be 
brought about. Whether or not understanding ourselves as products of the 
evolutionary process can bring about the particular kind of attitude change 
he meant may be doubtful, but I suspect that we should be willing to take 
the chance. 
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